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Revisiting the Issue of Democratic  
Deterioration in Venezuela, 1974–1998 
Anibal F. Gauna 
Abstract: This article examines the issue of democratic deterioration by 
revisiting the Venezuelan case (1974–1998). Using sequence elaboration 
and alternative case-focused theories, it tests and confirms the hypothe-
sis that presidential partyarchy was the main contextual explanatory fac-
tor behind the crisis that led to Venezuela’s democratic deterioration. 
Building on elite conflict theory, it also aims to integrate previous stud-
ies’ insights and better explain the timing of factors to illustrate how 
economic presidentialism (the highly autonomous executive control of a 
state-controlled economy) was the main mechanism leading to democrat-
ic deterioration.  
  Manuscript received 24 December 2015; accepted 9 February 2017 
Keywords: Venezuela, democratic deterioration, sequence elaboration, 
elite conflict theory, economic presidentialism 
Anibal F. Gauna holds a PhD from the Department of Sociology, State 
University of New York at Albany. He was also a professor at the 
Schools of Social Sciences, Education, and Social Communication at 
Andres Bello Catholic University, Venezuela, and at the School of Soci-
ology at Central University of Venezuela. 
E-mail: <agauna@fulbrightmail.org> 
 
  
  34 Anibal F. Gauna 
 
Introduction 
Venezuela was once a relatively well-established democratic regime, 
labeled “exceptional” by politicians and scholars of Latin American poli-
tics (Smith and McCoy 1995). So how did this country with general elec-
tions dominated by a bipartisan system, steady economic growth, and in-
dependent public powers come to be a delegitimized regime with a de-
clining economy, with an unreliable bureaucracy, and where the common 
citizen rejected political parties and even democracy itself? In this article1 
I examine the case of Venezuela’s democratic deterioration. In spite of 
the depth and breadth of literature addressing this democratic deteriora-
tion, there is little consensus in terms of an explanation; this is partly 
down to the scale of intellectual diversity that has sought to tackle the 
issue and also partly the result of the lack of any explicit assessments.  
One exception is the work of Coppedge (2005), who concludes that 
partyarchy was central to bringing about Venezuela’s democratic deterio-
ration. Using sequence elaboration (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2008), 
I test this finding and indeed conclude that Coppedge’s (1994) model of 
presidential partyarchy and factionalism better explicates what occurred 
in Venezuela. However, the model falls short of explaining the timing of 
democratic deterioration in Venezuela. To address this shortcoming, I 
build on elite conflict theory (Lachmann 2000, 2009) and identify eco-
nomic presidentialism (i.e., the highly autonomous presidential control of 
a state-controlled economy) as the key mechanism behind the crises that 
prompted the severe challenge to and public scrutiny of Venezuela’s 
once model (liberal) democracy.  
The Venezuelan Crises and Democratic  
Deterioration  
Scholars agree that a series of acute crises were responsible for Venezue-
la’s democratic deterioration (Hellinger 1996; Romero 1997; Caballero 
1998; Crisp and Levine 1998). In 1995 around 60 percent of Venezue-
lans were “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied” with democracy, 
while only 11 percent were “completely satisfied” (Latinobarómetro). It 
is hard to deny that something was afoot in a society that went from 
having a single-digit voter abstention rate from the beginning of the 
democratic period up to 1973 to having a rate close to 40 percent in 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Politics in Latin 
America, for their valuable insights. Any flaws herein are my sole responsibility. 
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1993 (Consejo Nacional Electoral, National Electoral Council). Voter turn-
out did not recover until 2006.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, Venezuela had one of the world’s 
most successful economies (Naím 1993: 19): compounded annual 
growth averaged a remarkable 6 percent, inflation remained relatively 
low, and GDP showed steady growth from 1943 to 1977 (Naím 1993: 
19). But from the mid-1970s, problems began to accumulate: the econ-
omy shrank for a period of eight consecutive years (1978–1985), real 
income per capita in 1985 was almost 15 percent lower than in 1973, 
foreign debt increased from USD 2 billion in 1973 to over USD 35 bil-
lion in 1982, and almost 70 percent of export revenues were devoted to 
the servicing of foreign debt by the mid-1980s (Naím 1993: 24–25). 
What is more, between 1981 and 1997, unemployment rose from 6.6 
percent to 15.4 percent, “the income share of the poorest 40 percent of 
the population fell from 19.1 percent […] to 14.7 percent,” and the in-
come share of “the wealthier decile increased from 21.8 to 32.8 percent” 
(Roberts 2003: 59–60). 
This period of economic hardship was followed by a social crisis. 
On the morning of 27 February 1989, about two weeks after the inaugu-
ration of Carlos Andrés Pérez as president, public transportation drivers 
and owners ignored an agreed 30 percent fare rise, which had been due 
to come into effect two days later, and imposed an immediate 100 per-
cent fare rise. Complaints turned into demonstrations, with riots spread-
ing across Caracas and other cities. For two days, turmoil ruled the city 
and parts of the countryside, violent military repression tempered the 
situation. Some NGOs estimated that over 400 people were killed and a 
further 1,500 injured during the two days of rioting.  
On 4 February 1992 Venezuela was caught unawares by an unsuc-
cessful military coup. Coup leader Hugo Chávez and his coconspirators 
were jailed and released two years later in 1994. (A second failed coup 
was carried out by some of Chávez’s allies on 27 November 1992.) In 
1993 President Pérez was impeached for embezzlement and finally re-
moved from office. The ensuing years saw those behind the attempted 
coups form the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) party (formally estab-
lished in 1997) and Chávez run for and easily win the presidency in 1998. 
Given this replacement of the country’s political elite and the continual 
overturning of state policies, especially those associated with neoliberal-
ism, the Chávez movement’s coming to office effectively signaled the 
death of the liberal regime that had been established in 1958 (McCoy, 
1999). How can this process of democratic deterioration be explained?  
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Explaining Democratic Deterioration  
Coppedge’s (2005) nested inference analysis, which uses a large sample 
to test general theories with the potential to explain democratic deterio-
ration, puts the Venezuelan case in perspective. Given that there are “too 
many hypotheses on democratization,” Coppedge limits his analysis to 
strands of the general hypothesis that wealthier countries tend to be 
more democratic. He finds that,  
After 1992, Venezuela’s level of democracy declined to levels well 
below the range predicted by economic theories, but this change 
was not predicted by the economic theories alone. Some other 
reason must be sought (Coppedge 2005: 301; original emphasis).  
The best-fitting explanatory factor for the pattern of the residuals is the 
strength of the social democratic Acción Democrática (Democratic Ac-
tion, AD) and the Christian democratic Comité de Organización Política 
Electoral Independiente (Independent Political Electoral Organization 
Committee, COPEI) – the two main parties associated with founding the 
1958 democratic regime. According to the author, the moral outrage 
expressed by Venezuelans toward their country’s economic decline re-
veals the significant impact the decline had given that partyarchy had 
institutionalized impunity for corruption. Partyarchy also explains why 
parties made no effort to adapt in an attempt to reestablish their appeal 
to voters. The parties’ vertical hierarchies combined with their tight dis-
cipline forced new leaders to rise slowly through the ranks. For many, 
the 1999 election of Hugo Chávez represented the opposite of what the 
two main parties had come to represent.  
An alternative test is required for the Venezuelan case, first and 
foremost because Coppedge’s test does not provide a wider analysis of 
the qualitative factors that may have played a part in the country’s demo-
cratic deterioration. Since Coppedge’s work primarily tests the role of 
economic growth in this process, there remains a so-called black box 
regarding the historical explanation. Coppedge assumes partyarchy is the 
key factor behind the country’s democratic deterioration and thus pro-
vides an ad hoc argument based on Venezuelans’ feelings of moral out-
rage. In this sense his conclusion can be seen as a hypothesis – one that 
itself begs to be put to the test. As I will argue, sequence elaboration is 
very well suited to carrying out this test.  
Following the application of this method, a compound explanation 
can be expressed via a single, simplified causal model, as shown in figure 
1. This analysis draws on secondary sources to first compare arguments 
and then to test these arguments against the backdrop of historical 
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events and processes. This approach is complemented in the last part of 
the article with the use of primary data, mainly from the Central Bank of 
Venezuela. In figure 1 the arrows represent causal relationships. Text 
outside of the boxes represents secondary factors, whereas bold letters 
represent the main explanatory mechanisms. Additionally, despite Chá-
vez’s assertion that the 1992 coup attempts were motivated by the re-
pression during El Caracazo in 1989, I consider them to be independent 
factors since the military conspiracy led by Chavez began in 1978 – well 
before the other crises had fully unfolded. (Even if the repression of the 
1989 riots was an additional event that rallied people to the cause, ulti-
mately, it had no bearing on either the outcome or the timing, because 
the coups failed and were only launched following the conspirators’ 
elevation to higher ranks within the military.) 
Figure 1. Simplified Causal Model of Democratic Deterioration in  
Venezuela 
 
As we can see in figure 1 (which summarizes the relationships between 
alternative case-focused explanations of the Venezuelan crises that led to 
democratic deterioration), presidential partyarchy and factionalism is the 
major factor behind democratic deterioration – at least in the sense that 
it antecedes the other explanatory factors. Yet, as I will argue below, this 
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model lacks a criterion explaining the timing of the process. This article 
elaborates on the idea that the economic presidentialism (the highly 
autonomous executive control of a state-controlled economy) set in 
place during President Pérez’s first term (1974–1979) was the causal 
factor that triggered the chain of contextual variables leading to demo-
cratic deterioration. I will demonstrate in the last part of this article how 
this mechanism unfolded. Before that, however, I will reveal how I ar-
rived at figure 1, by considering each of the alternative case-focused 
explanations in more depth. These explanations provide the input need-
ed to establish the temporal organization of the various causes of the 
breakdown of puntofijismo – the democratic system of governance estab-
lished by the Pact of Puntofijo in 1958.  
Testing Alternative Case-Focused Theories of 
Democratic Deterioration 
To test alternative case-focused theories of democratic deterioration in 
Venezuela, I use sequence elaboration (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 
2008). This method enables me to apply an alternative test (distinct to 
that conducted by Coppedge) to the qualitative part of the explanation 
and to answer the following questions: How can we tell which argument 
is correct from two competing explanations that view the choices made 
at two different junctures as equally critical? How can we determine 
whether an initial causal factor or an intervening, posterior factor is more 
important than the other? By examining multiple variables in this way, 
sequence elaboration enables us to identify which factors are contextual 
and which relate more directly to democratic deterioration. As is general-
ly the case when seeking to identify causal links, the principle of prece-
dence (i.e., whether variables are antecedent or subsequent) is of para-
mount importance. Just like other methods, such as process-tracing 
(George and Bennett 2005), sequence elaboration aims to establish links 
between possible causes and outcomes in small populations of cases. 
This method also deals with post hoc fallacy (i.e., the risk that the sole 
precedence of a factor is sufficient to establish causality), because se-
quence elaboration provides a framework for evaluating the relative 
importance of various causes by enabling researchers to consider the 
position of causes in a sequence. I carry out this identification process by 
comparing the key events and processes previously analyzed in some of 
the most paradigmatic works on the demise of Venezuela’s democratic 
regime.  
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In addition, sequence elaboration offers criteria for distinguishing 
the type of causes that make up the sequence as a whole rather than an 
estimation of probabilistic causal effects for larger populations of cases. 
This is accomplished by identifying a cause as one of the following: (1) 
necessary but not sufficient, (2) sufficient but not necessary, (3) neces-
sary and sufficient, (4) an insufficient but necessary condition (INUS – 
part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition), and (5) a sufficient but 
unnecessary condition (SUIN – part of an insufficient but necessary 
condition). In brief, this approach is based on the application of Lazars-
feld’s elaboration model to a set of causes – which I undertake with the 
help of Boolean algebra in the present article.  
Of course, the goal of conducting such testing is not to disprove 
any of the explanations but rather to identify one that best accounts for 
the general process of democratic deterioration. Big events like demo-
cratic breakdowns usually have multiple causes. Explaining them is often 
not necessarily a matter of disproving alternative hypotheses in favor of 
one’s own, but rather a matter of trying to figure out which are most 
critical and which are more contextual and to shape the background so 
that the triggering factor will emerge. I therefore contend that although 
presidential partyarchy was the main cause of the demise of liberal de-
mocracy in Venezuela, the economic presidentialism established during 
President Pérez’s first term (1974–1979) is the main factor explaining 
why, when, and how it happened.  
I begin with a general causal model that will later be used to identify 
more specific factors within each of the simpler models. The initial caus-
al link, as presented in the literature, was a series of crises that acted to 
diminish the credibility of democratic institutions. This created room for 
radical movements and outsiders to enter the political arena (who in turn 
made it their mission to dismantle the existing democratic institutions). 
In this case democratic deterioration (DemD) is the outcome to be ex-
plained. There were two partial crises: an economic (EC) crisis and a 
political crisis that acted as a legitimation crisis (LC). Their relationships 
can be represented hypothetically as follows: EC  n  DemD and 
LC  n  DemD, where “n” denotes “necessary condition.” Differen-
tiation between the economic and legitimation crises is based solely on 
which is considered by the authors to be the main antecedent factor – 
that is, whether the crisis is located in the realm of political economy (oil 
booms and the developmental model) or in the political sphere (parties 
and state bureaucracy). Let us now weigh the contribution of each of the 
five leading explanations of the democratic deterioration in Venezuela.  
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Oil Booms (OB) and the Institutional Logic of a  
Petrostate  
According to Karl (1997: 58), Venezuela can be considered a petrostate 
because it “depends on revenues generated by a depletable commodity” 
which “produces extraordinary rents” that are “funneled through weak 
institutions,” which effectively guarantees “that the public sector will 
lack the authority and corporate cohesiveness necessary to exercise effec-
tive capacity.” Also, the country’s incumbents and policymakers in-
creased public spending during oil boom periods, creating patterns that 
were difficult to change – a practice which increased external and inter-
nal budget deficits and ultimately weakened state capacity.  
This theory highlights the role of oil booms in shaping the Vene-
zuelan state and affirms that oil booms did indeed have a detrimental 
effect on public-spending decisions, thus helping to explain both the 
severity of the Venezuelan fiscal crisis and its timing. Although I draw 
upon this model when discussing the timing of the democratic deteriora-
tion, it cannot (and is obviously not intended to) account for the dynam-
ics of the political actors within the political arena. For example, specific 
decisions on the allocation of state resources cannot be explained by the 
general principle of “more revenue, more spending, more debt”; rather, 
they are expounded by the interelite dynamics established at the time of 
the oil booms.  
The Breakdown of the Developmental Model (BDM)  
Jonathan DiJohn (2009: 258) argues (in contrast to the paradox of plenty 
thesis) that natural resources have not systematically determined state 
incentives over long periods and that Venezuela’s pattern of poor indus-
trial growth bears closer resemblance to other non-oil-producing Latin 
American countries than is acknowledged by rentier state theorists. The 
core of his argument is that an acceleration (or slowdown) in growth is a 
result of compatibility (or a lack thereof) between development strategies 
and political settlements. In the early, “easy” stage of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) substitution is for nondurable consumer goods, 
which requires small-scale and low-value-added industrialization strate-
gies, as well as small-scale technology. The more advanced stages of ISI 
and big-push industrialization (“a synchronized expansion of industrial 
sectors, coordinated by the state” (DiJohn 2009: 179)) involve the pro-
duction of consumer durables, intermediate goods, and capital goods – 
which implies more advanced technology and the development of larger 
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firms that respond to the centrality of scale economies in intermediate 
technology sectors.  
Venezuela’s collapse of growth, which started in the 1970s, was 
therefore the result of the country being a consolidated state with frag-
mented political organizations at a time when the development strategy 
for the country (big-push, natural resource–based industrialization) called 
for centralized organizations. Although this theory can explain the steady 
decline of growth and industrial development in Venezuela, when Di-
John compares Venezuela with Malaysia, he seems to find himself drawn 
to the role of “centralized political organizations” in sustained growth. 
Therefore, we are led to conclude that it is mainly conflict within the 
party system (fragmentation of political organizations) that accounts for 
the Venezuelan economic crisis. 
These two models illustrate that the collapse of the economy during 
the 1980s was so severe that even a relatively functional democracy like 
that of Venezuela had difficulty surviving. Events such as El Caracazo 
and the 1992 coups would also have been part of the drawn-out process 
of democratic failure. Moreover, the fiscal crisis prompted by the oil 
booms and the breakdown of the developmental model occurred prior 
to the demise of the liberal system in the late 1990s. However, they were 
mediated by the organization of public administration.  
The Organization of Public Administration (OPA) 
As parties and the executive took over the state, public administration 
became a means by which power could be stabilized through clientelism 
and patronage. During the years of consolidation of the party system 
after 1958, public spending was “shifted from the centralized public 
administration (CPA) to the decentralized public administration (DPA) 
which was almost exclusively controlled by the executive” and comprised 
about 400 entities (Crisp and Levine 1998: 36). These organizations in-
cluded public enterprises, autonomous institutes, credit institutions, and 
regional development corporations, inter alia, while their governing 
boards included interest group representatives, particularly from business 
(Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce [Fedecámaras]) and 
labor unions (Confederation of Workers of Venezuela [CTV]). Govern-
ment spending on such entities was a way of responding to the demands 
of the private sector and of providing finance capital for private-sector 
initiatives and production (Levine and Crisp 1995: 232–233). The DPA, 
however, did not translate spending by the executive branch into a de-
concentration of power; nor did DPA organizations come under elec-
toral control. A side effect of this method of organization was that it was 
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exclusionary – excluding actors from the political arena and the policy-
making agenda – and thus resulted in power being concentrated in une-
lected bodies or a weak bureaucracy (Levine and Crisp 1995: 236).  
A weak bureaucracy is a key factor to understanding why the politi-
cal crisis could not be reversed, as opposed to being a direct cause of 
democratic deterioration itself. It is a fundamental intervenient factor 
that better explains the permanence of the system than the crisis itself, 
with the latter arising more as a result of external pressures from other 
sources. Rather, the most important mechanism behind the economic 
crisis (EC) was the breakdown of ISI (BDM), as claimed by DiJohn 
(2009), which lasted from the mid-1970s until (at least) 2005. But we also 
know that oil booms (OB) are crisis-prone, particularly because they 
shape the organization of public administration (OPA) in ways that ren-
der it highly dependent on petrodollars (the fiscal crisis). Thus as a first 
step, we have  
OB  OPA | (BDM  OPA)  s  EC 
where “s” denotes “sufficient condition”; “n,” “necessary condition”; 
and , the logical operator “and.” Our causal story does not end here, 
however, for we still need to account for the dynamics of the political 
system per se. 
The Closing of the Party System (CP) 
The political system’s loss of legitimacy was pinned to the “low priority 
given to citizens’ rights by political institutions and their leadership” 
(Gómez 1998: 172). From the late 1970s onwards, the party system be-
came rigid as a result of party elitism and democratic centralism (Martz 
1995: 32, 35). The dominant parties (AD and COPEI) and interest 
groups (mainly FEDECAMARAS and CTV) were able to control the 
policymaking agenda, thereby excluding emerging civil society groups 
from political participation. “In short, party elites were no longer in 
touch with the public” (Martz 1998: 73). Three important factors estab-
lished the gap between state officials and society. First, electoral law 
made officials less responsible to the electorate. Second, because parties 
were present in every arena of social life, from trade unions to student 
associations, they permanently cut off the influence of parallel organiza-
tions in the policymaking process. Third, voters saw their options in-
creasingly reduced as the two dominant parties (the center-left AD and 
center-right COPEI) became more similar ideologically, shifting preelec-
tion coalitions in legislative alliances from issue to issue after the election 
(Crisp and Levine 1998: 35).  
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This factor saw the system come under severe public criticism and 
become subject to pressures and tensions from outside the political 
structure. New groups demanding participation found themselves frus-
trated, while patronage became a source of discontent for common citi-
zens unable to find an alternative despite their complaints. Yet this factor 
can be better addressed by exploring the dynamics within and between 
elite parties.  
Presidential Partyarchy (PP) 
Another important feature of the Venezuelan political system was presi-
dential partyarchy (Coppedge 1994) – an arrangement in which factional 
struggles within parties over nomination campaigns took a prominent 
role. Although this system enhanced democratic stability and insulated 
technocratic policymakers, it also undermined democracy by closing 
citizens’ channels of participation. Freedom to organize was restricted by 
the parties, which in turn hindered the activities of the media, interest 
groups, and civil society institutions more generally. With this in mind, 
the riots and looting that occurred during El Caracazo in February 1989 
could be understood as an alternative, violent response to the shock 
program of President Pérez in a context where other channels for ex-
pressing grievances were blocked (Coppedge 1994: 160). In the long 
term partyarchy fosters disillusionment with parties and democracy, and 
presidentialism is insufficiently flexible to correct this frustration. 
As illustrated in the simplified causal model (see figure 1), this anal-
ysis incorporates the diagnosis of the closing of the party system while 
also providing important clues for understanding the fragmentation of 
political organizations (DiJohn 2009). It also offers elements useful for 
understanding the political settlements fostered by the oil booms (Karl 
1997). Nevertheless, Coppedge’s complete model of within-party behav-
ior does not link the internal (or within-party) dynamics of the political 
system with the external dynamics. For example, the model is unable to 
explain the 1992 coups as a result of the presidential-congressional 
stalemate. Likewise, even if we accept that El Caracazo was an alternative 
response to the closing of the party system and the channels of represen-
tation, it cannot be understood without taking into account the neoliber-
al reforms that were implemented during the reformation process of the 
late 1980s and 1990s. Both examples represent anomalies to the trajecto-
ry of presidential partyarchy. In brief, presidential partyarchy explains the 
normal functioning of the Venezuelan political system and the closing of 
political parties; it cannot, however, explain the anomalies in the system 
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or their timing, which are at the institutional root of the deterioration of 
democracy in Venezuela.  
I have now presented all the elements necessary to demonstrate that 
the main explanatory factor of democratic deterioration (DemD) was in 
fact the legitimation crisis (LC). As the crises in question actually hap-
pened (historically), their relations can be represented as  
 
 
 
where INUS denotes an “insufficient but necessary condition which is 
part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.” The economic crisis 
(EC), in turn, is a SUIN (“sufficient but unnecessary condition which is 
part of an insufficient but necessary condition”) factor that explains 
DemD – that is, it is not necessary or sufficient for DemD but is one 
factor among others that led to the outcome. According to sequence 
elaboration, the legitimation crisis is thus more relevant to understanding 
the events that contributed to Venezuela’s democratic deterioration, 
which is confirmed by the rule of chronological proximity. Therefore, 
although the economic crisis had a part in the process, its role in the 
democratic deterioration was more contextual than that of the legitima-
tion crisis. I will now break this down piece by piece. 
On the one hand, as previously concluded, the economic crisis 
(EC) is to be considered a result of the breakdown of the developmental 
model (BDM s EC). Together with the organization of public ad-
ministration (OPA), which was shaped by the oil booms (OB), BDM 
provides a sufficient explanation of the EC. On the other hand, BDM 
was caused by the fragmentation of political organizations (FPO), given 
the particular stage of development (SD) at the time. And the FPO was 
the result of factionalism in presidential partyarchy (PP). This historical 
synthesis can be logically represented as follows: 
PP s FPO | (FPO  SD) s BDM | BDM s EC 
The legitimation crisis (LC) was a direct result of the closing of political 
parties (CP), which itself was the result of PP. In this case, the OPA 
once again played a role, which was also shaped by PP. Thus, as present-
ed in figure 1 (see above), 
[PP s FPO]  [PP  n  CP]  [PP  s  OPA],  
[BDM  CP  OPA]  DemD 
EC  INUS LC  n  DemD
   
SUIN
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The sequence elaboration used here leads to the conclusion that presi-
dential partyarchy is at the root of the process of democratic deteriora-
tion. However, as unmasked by the analytic decomposition, the follow-
ing questions remain: What explains the timing of the process of demo-
cratic deterioration if there was previously a relatively long period of 
presidential partyarchy? What triggered the entropy of the system? In the 
next section I build on elite conflict theory to address these issues, con-
structing a more encompassing and robust argument by including the 
main contributions of each model. 
Introducing Elite Conflict Theory 
As I will show, elite conflict theory enables me to elaborate on the previ-
ously exposed arguments and, with the support of additional data and 
references, to answer the queries arising from the analytic test. According 
to elite conflict theory, first of all, “chains of contingent change [begin] 
with elites, not classes or individuals” (Lachmann 2000: 9). Methodologi-
cally, elite conflict theory suggests a three-step analysis. The first step 
involves identifying “moments when relations among elites and between 
elites and the state change” (Lachmann 2009: 57). The second step con-
sists of evaluating “the consequences of such episodes, specifying which 
elites gain or lose control over resources and the capacity to set policies” 
(Lachmann 2009: 57). The third step involves evaluating “each change in 
the relative power and autonomy of the state and rival elites for its effect 
on that state’s capacity to meet particular geopolitical challenges of the 
moment” (Lachmann 2009: 57). In contrast to rational choice theory, in 
elite conflict theory “opportunities for structural change do not end after 
a single decisive episode of state-elite conflict and learning. Rather, elites, 
conflicts, and sequences of structural change are multiple” (Lachmann 
2009: 57).  
Explaining the origins and timing of the Venezuelan crisis requires 
us to go beyond the pattern of presidential partyarchy and to consider an 
anomaly of the pattern created by interelite dynamics. In Venezuela such 
an anomaly was the result of the interactions between business and party 
elites and the consequences thereof on the organization of the state. 
Pérez’s first administration (1974–1979) was key to establishing the or-
ganization of public administration, which subsequently made reform 
very difficult. During this period, the Pérez government witnessed the 
breakdown of the developmental model at its higher stages (DiJohn 
2009), coinciding with both the first oil boom, which occurred in 1974 
(Karl 1997) and the first deviant case of factionalism (Coppedge 1994), 
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thereby effectively “locking in” the distinct organization of public ad-
ministration (Crisp 1998a).  
Therefore, the key to explaining the origins of Venezuela’s demo-
cratic deterioration is to be found in this period – during which a new set 
of interelite relationships was established, through which the state was 
configured in such a way that future modification was rendered very 
difficult. We can refer to this new configuration as economic presiden-
tialism – that is, the executive’s highly autonomous control over the 
state-controlled economy. This arrangement was an anomaly of the sys-
tem and resulted from the contingent encounter of the normal dynamics 
of presidential partyarchy, changing external and internal economic con-
ditions, and an ambitious political actor. This mechanism was at the root 
of what later locked in the state organization through corporatist forms 
of participation (Levine and Crisp 1995; Crisp 1996; Crisp 1998a; Crisp 
and Levine 1998). The crisis of the ISI model was somehow masked by 
the oil booms of the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, there was never an 
opportunity to catch up with the program of foreign borrowing – a re-
sult not only of the fiscal crisis but also of the fact that Venezuelan in-
dustrialization had been in a state of steady decline ever since the 1970s 
(DiJohn 2009). In the 1980s, when the ISI model crashed and the oil 
booms led to pressure to borrow, economic presidentialism made any 
readjustment during the crisis nearly impossible. This combination 
proved disastrous for democracy in Venezuela. I now trace those rela-
tionships, from Pérez’s first term up to the period just prior to his sec-
ond term, when neoliberal reforms and El Caracazo came to promi-
nence.  
Carlos Andrés Pérez: The Anomaly of  
Presidential Partyarchy, 1974–1979 
Pérez’s 1973 election coincided with the ISI model breaking down and 
an unprecedented oil boom. The interaction between those two factors, 
his grandiose political style, and his confrontation with the ruling party 
elite set in motion a chain of events whose immediate consequences help 
to explain the legitimation crisis that later emerged. Pérez’s first period in 
office has widely been recognized as a distinctive one within the Vene-
zuelan democratic experience. To begin with, no other president had 
known such a positive political climate: an AD-dominated Congress, the 
support of the armed forces, the Left’s return to institutional politics 
following its subversion, the Right’s acceptance of the prosperity and 
safety offered by the system, the student body’s return to a state of calm, 
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and an unprecedented budget of VEF 45 billion (Velásquez 1993: 366). 
Furthermore, his vision for public administration signalled a rupture with 
previous governments and the end of broad-coalition governments in 
Venezuelan democracy (Aguiar 2009: 197–198).  
On 29 April 1974, only a couple of months following his inaugura-
tion, Congress granted Pérez special powers allowing him to rule by 
decree. His first decree was the creation of a blue ribbon commission, 
which was tasked with exploring ways to accelerate the reversion of the 
oil concessions, which were due to expire in 1983. His second decree 
established the Commission for the Integral Reform of the Public Ad-
ministration (CRIAP) (Gómez and López-Maya 1990: 79; Velásquez 
1993: 368–370). The government’s Great Venezuela program (also called 
the Fifth Plan of the Nation) was characterized by overt intervention in 
the economy through direct investment and credits. This generated a 
massive expansion of the system of state-owned enterprises, which was 
intended to reorient ISI toward the international market (Ochoa 1997: 
129).  
As a result of Pérez’s reorientation of the state, several significant 
changes took place. First, factional conflicts entwined two dimensions – 
one consisting of political elites, particularly within the AD (as predicted 
by the presidential partyarchy model) and one consisting of political 
elites and big business (not predicted by the presidential partyarchy mod-
el). Following the end of the dictatorship in 1958, there was a tendency 
for representatives of large industrial groups to be included in govern-
ment, particularly in ministries. Under Pérez, the difference was that the 
conflict within the AD also resulted in a conflict between economic 
groups (Duno 1975: 106). In fact, Pérez considered the traditional eco-
nomic elites to represent an older stage of capitalism – a stage to be 
topped by the new multinational-led capitalism. He believed that a more 
advanced stage of ISI, characterized by multimillion-dollar investments, 
was required (Duno 1975: 74; Martín 1975: 113).  
The new interelite arrangements started when, during the presiden-
tial campaign, Pérez lost the support of the leading technical cadres with-
in the party and the economic groups who had backed the previous 
Leoni AD government – the so-called Grupo Guayana. This was certain-
ly a result of factionalism within partyarchy. Pérez sought and won the 
support of an emerging group of entrepreneurs, a relationship which 
changed the orientation of state–business relations by directly affecting 
the state’s structure and policy orientation (an element not considered in 
the presidential partyarchy model). This group came to be publicly 
known as the Apostles. Up to this point, the business elites were satisfied 
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with having loyal people in key positions. Incorporating the Grupo Oc-
cidente changed things since it (i) implied that the emerging economic 
group had become embedded within the state, as businesses were carried 
by those who were simultaneously private entrepreneurs and representa-
tives of the executive branch and (ii) prompted the establishment of 
some sort of “shadow cabinet” independent of the official state repre-
sentatives (Martín 1975: 162–163). The emerging entrepreneurs/politic-
ians had the same financial resources as traditional groups, but they also 
had the authority to make the state act in a manner favorable to their 
interests. Favoritism of the traditional and largest economic groups was 
thus somehow challenged, and new links to high officials became more 
prominent than ever. For Pérez, this represented a way to democratize 
capital by forming an emergent bourgeoisie, which was in contrast to the 
previous oligarchical structure of ownership (Karl 1997: 148). To the 
ruling party represented by Betancourt and the old guard of the AD, it 
signified a diminishment of their influence.  
The conflict became apparent in a number of crucial areas. For ex-
ample, there was an extension of the functions of the Ministry of Plan-
ning (Cordiplan, formerly the Central Office of Coordination and Plan-
ning), while those of the Treasury were reduced to being merely adjunc-
tive to those of the former. Additionally, the Law of Planning formalized 
the extreme centralization of the state bureaucracy and weakened the 
cabinet, with the exception of key positions all held by members of the 
Apostles.  
In summary, Pérez broke the balance between presidentialism and 
partyarchy in favor of the former and in ways that fundamentally shaped 
the structure of the state. This new type of political control over the 
economy was the result of a relationship between the president, the state 
bureaucracy, and the economy and was exercised through four dimen-
sions. 
Centralization of Planning 
Despite having held the faculties of constitutional planning since at least 
1947, the central state was not regarded as the planning entity for the 
entire economy until the 1960s, following the creation of the Cordiplan 
(Brewer-Carías 1983: 7–8). Planning had been the sole responsibility of 
the executive since the start of the democratic period in 1958, with the 
president required only to present to Congress the “general guidelines of 
the economic and social development plan of the nation” (Brewer-Carías 
1983: 22). But until 1976, plans were not judicially mandatory for natural 
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persons, the public sector, or the legislative chambers. However, they 
were made mandatory by presidential decree on 9 March 1976 and rati-
fied by the Ministerial Council. Congress, the regional authorities, and 
even sectorial offices were left completely out of the planning process. 
Although their exclusion reflected a clear trend that had been in place 
since 1958, due the bureaucratic organization of the state, it had now 
become institutionalized (Brewer-Carías 1983: 29–33). The planning pro-
cess became entirely the responsibility of the executive.  
Expansion of the Decentralized Public  
Administration  
In explaining how autarkic development could be reconciled with de-
mocracy in Venezuela, Crisp (1998b) refers to the DPA as a privileged 
space in which economic groups’ access to the policymaking process and 
oil rents could be assured. The DPA was structured in a way that openly 
favored executive power, because the decentralized entities had their 
own budgets and even the capacity to acquire debt without any over-
sight. Twenty-one of these entities were created during the Pérez presi-
dency alone. Out of some 2,800 members of consultative bodies, nation-
al-level public officials accounted for about 90 percent, with 95 percent 
of these coming from the executive branch (Crisp 1998a: 32). This meant 
that the governing boards of the DPA were isolated in the executive, 
“where all officials except one are appointed rather than elected” (Crisp 
1998b: 11). Moreover, public expenditure was radically modified under 
the Pérez administration. For instance, in 1960 the central government 
accounted for 70 percent of expenditure; the DPA 30, percent. Howev-
er, by 1980 (the year following the end of Pérez’s first presidential term), 
these figures were 33 percent and 67 percent, respectively (Kornblith and 
Maingon 1985: 50, quoted by Crisp 1998b: 13). This indicated that the 
structure of public expenditure was moving to a place where the presi-
dent held overwhelming control of the budget, out of reach of Congress 
(Gil 1992: 296).  
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Table 1.  Creation of Public-Law Entities in the Decentralized Public Ad-
ministration 
Government  Totals 
Betancourt 
(1959–1964) 6  6 
Leoni 
(1964–1969)  12  18 
Caldera 
(1969–1979)  13  31 
Pérez 
(1974–1979) 
  21  52 
Herrera 
(1979–1984) 
   9  61 
Lusinchi 
(1984–1989) 
  7 68 
Source:  Crisp (1998b: 32–38, appendix 1). 
The Height of Subsidy-Based Economic Policy  
During the Pérez administration, there was an unprecedented rise in 
subsidies. Given the characteristics of the planning process previously 
described, these subsidies were determined almost entirely by the execu-
tive. Figure 2 illustrates how subsidies (as a percentage of public expendi-
ture) have varied along with fluctuations in public expenditure (as a per-
centage of GDP): as public expenditure rose or declined, so too did the 
subsidies, but only for the periods 1950–1973 and 1991–1998. This 
means that during Pérez’s first government and until the first year of his 
second term, subsidies soared as a proportion of total public expendi-
ture. The peak in 1989 can be explained, in all likelihood, by an attempt 
to regain popularity following the events of El Caracazo.  
The second diagram below (see figure 3) shows the particular priori-
ties of each government by year. From 1973 to 1975, for example, subsi-
dies to trade rose as a proportion of total subsidies. After this period, we 
see a trend where subsidies to the manufacturing industry rose steadily 
alongside total subsidies up to 1991. What we see from 1992 to 1998 is 
not a sudden rise in subsidies to transportation but rather the virtual 
disappearance of subsidies to any other branch of the economy – which 
is consistent with the information provided in table 1. This was perhaps 
a result of both the new orientation of the state and the economic crisis. 
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Figure 2. The Rise and Decline of Subsidy-Based Economic Policy in 
Venezuela, 1974–1998 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Venezuela. 
In any case, however, it indicated a reduction of the subsidy-based eco-
nomic policy just prior to the elections that marked the demise of 
partyarchy – first in the almost inertial government of Caldera and then 
in the game-changing election of 1998. The executive therefore not only 
allocated resources to the private sector with virtually no system of 
checks and balances in place, it also prioritized private-sector resource 
allocation over public expenditure during this period.  
Figure 3. Distribution of Subsidies by Area of the Economy, 1968–1998 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Venezuela. 
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Control of the System of State-Owned  
Enterprises 
Pérez announced a reform of the state in December 1974. In brief, this 
reform aimed to increase the power of the executive and the private 
sector and circumvent political parties. This was to be achieved primarily 
through centralizing the state enterprise system, expanding public-private 
commissions (considered by President Pérez to be an elite consensus-
building mechanism (Karl 1997: 143–145)), and implementing tax re-
form, which never actually took hold. Pérez was determined to challenge 
partyarchy and to promote his new vision of the economy. By April 
1975, during and after a debate in the Chamber of Deputies about the 
role of these new business elites, tensions escalated between parties, the 
executive branch, and within the AD over the issue of state enterprise 
oversight. The AD insisted on ministerial oversight, while Pérez insisted 
on presidential oversight. These tensions generated sufficiently strong 
opposition for the reform to be killed off. But Pérez circumvented the 
opposition by creating the Ministry for the Promotion, Organization, 
and Supervision of Basic Industries (shortly afterwards becoming the 
Ministry of the Secretariat of the President and coming under exclusive 
presidential control). The ministry was headed by Carmelo Lauría (a 
member of the Apostles) and was designed to oversee industrial projects 
in mining, steel, energy, petrochemicals, and metallurgy (Karl 1997: 150). 
Pérez’s government nationalized the iron ore industry on 1 January 1975 
and the oil industry a year later. This meant that the executive had direct 
control over all of the Venezuelan state’s most important sources of 
income.  
Moreover, Pérez’s close associate and head of CRIAP, Pedro Tino-
co, argued that political parties were an obstacle to the overseeing of 
public enterprises. His solution was a more centralized and presidentialist 
model of managing the system of state-owned enterprises (DiJohn 2009: 
104). Even though the CRIAP project was rejected by Congress, in prac-
tice, its main technocratic ideas were adopted in the basic state-owned 
industries. For example, with the exception of the oil industry, basic 
industries were placed under the control of the Venezuelan Corporation 
of Guayana (CVG, a holding of mining and power enterprises) and the 
Endowment of Investments of Venezuela (FIV, the owner of the shares) 
(Ochoa 1997: 132). They were thus all subject to presidential oversight.  
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From Herrera (1979–1984) to Lusinchi (1984–
1989) 
The subsequent governments of Herrera (COPEI) and Lusinchi (AD) 
had at least two things in common: they both inherited Pérez’s reconfig-
uration of the state and both deepened the crisis. In spite of its massive 
fiscal income from oil revenues, the Herrera government inherited a total 
debt of at least VEF 49 billion – about USD 11.4 billion (Aguiar 2009: 
215). The fate of his administration was sealed by the so-called Black 
Friday of 18 February 1983, when Venezuela experienced a shock depre-
ciation of its currency and the exchange rate was devalued by 20 percent 
(both for the first time). Although the Herrera government distanced 
itself from Pérez in that it was oriented toward lower-class voters and 
had a tense relationship with business (Aguiar 2009: 224), it left the state 
structure and interelite dynamics untouched.  
President Lusinchi took office in 1984. On 10 February of that year, 
the government announced an adjustment plan that was approved a 
posteriori by the International Monetary Fund. The plan comprised a 
multiple exchange-rate system, low interest rates for the agricultural 
sector, increases in the prices of gasoline and other petroleum-derived 
products, a 10 percent reduction in current expenses, and other austerity 
measures. However, the plan was discarded following poor results be-
tween 1984 and 1985 and substituted with a new economic program 
based on public expenditure, which came into effect for the period 
1986–1987. In 1986 the government devalued the bolívar again (falling 
from VEF 7.5 = USD 1 to VEF 14.5 = USD 1), expansionary measures 
increased the fiscal deficit, and inflation soared to 92.8 percent.  
The Lusinchi administration was also particularly sectarian, and in 
1986 Lusinchi appointed 17 of the 24 sectional general secretaries of his 
AD party as governors – the total opposite of the position taken by the 
Pérez administration. For our purposes here, however, there were no 
substantial changes between these two governments and the previous 
Pérez government. They can both be considered a continuation of the 
state structure and the interelite dynamics institutionalized by the Pérez 
administration. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, attempts were made 
to reform the Venezuelan state. There was a partial decentralization and 
various free-market and electoral reforms were implemented. But the 
state, for the most part, remained untouched, and the legitimation crisis 
only intensified during Pérez’s second government.  
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Conclusion 
The sequence elaboration test carried out in this paper confirms 
Coppedge’s finding that the specifics of the crisis leading to Venezuela’s 
democratic deterioration are primarily explained by the dynamics of 
partyarchy (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2008). Thus partyarchy can be 
seen as the contextual structural factor leading to democratic deteriora-
tion. Partyarchy favored the closing of parties as long as politics became 
dominated by factional struggles within parties, setting aside other more 
inclusionary practices. Meanwhile, factionalism fostered the fragmenta-
tion of political organizations, which was a key factor in the breakdown 
of the developmental model. Additionally, the elitism of partyarchy 
shaped how public administration was organized in such a way that it 
reinforced and promulgated patronage and exclusion. This is presented 
in a synthesized formula:  
[PP s FPO]  [PP  n  CP]  [PP  s  OPA], 
[BDM  CP  OPA]  DemD 
This formula demonstrates that presidential partyarchy (PP) is at the 
root of the crises leading to the process of democratic deterioration 
(DemD). The partyarchy model does not, however, explain the timing of 
this process. Indeed, as Coppedge explains, given the parties’ vertical 
hierarchy and tight discipline, any opportunity there may have been for 
the emergence of new leadership, with new ideas, was not possible; yet 
an explanation of how institutional elements were demanding that such 
new leadership be forged are missing in this account. Elite conflict theo-
ry provides a suitable framework to integrate other case-focused theories 
of democratic deterioration into a more robust account of when a crisis 
started and how the elements sustaining it were “institutionalized” in the 
state. The central institutional mechanism of this explanation can be 
labeled economic presidentialism, which includes the centralization of 
planning, the expansion of the DPA, the rise of subsidy-based economic 
policy, and the executive’s control of the system of state-owned enter-
prises.  
These four dimensions tell the story of a critical “presidentializa-
tion” of the economy that, although not always or entirely opposed to 
the party elite (Sierra 1993: 67), granted the executive branch important 
leeway to make decisions on allocations with virtually no system of 
checks and balances in place. This mechanism, if not an explanation of 
every dimension of the Venezuelan crisis, does have a place at the very 
foundation of the crisis and proved to be a catalyst for the persistent 
legitimation crisis. The mechanism connects presidentialism and faction-
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alism, the fiscal crisis, and patronage and corporatism within the public 
administration. Through this theoretical integration, it becomes apparent 
that the simultaneity of an anomaly of presidential partyarchy, changing 
external and internal economic conditions, and an ambitious political 
actor established an institutional path that was very difficult to change 
later and one in which corporatist practices stood out. Democratic dete-
rioration was thus the result not of a sudden crisis but rather of a pro-
longed state of presidential arbitrariness incubated within the Venezuelan 
state in the context of industrial decline.  
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Revisitando la cuestión del deterioro de la democracia en Vene-
zuela, 1974–1998 
Resumen: Este artículo examina la cuestión del deterioro de la demo-
cracia a través de una revisión del caso venezolano (1974–1988). Usando 
‘elaboración de secuencias’ y teorías alternativas enfocadas en el caso, el 
artículo prueba y confirma que la ‘partidocracia presidencialista’ fue el 
principal factor explicativo contextual detrás de la crisis que condujo al 
deterioro de la democracia de Venezuela. Elaborando sobre la base de la 
teoría del conflicto de elites, el artículo también apunta a integrar las 
contribuciones de estudios previos, así como a explicar mejor la tempo-
ralidad (‘timing’) de los factores explicativos para ilustrar cómo el ‘presi-
dencialismo económico’ (el control autónomo del poder ejecutivo sobre 
una economía controlada por el Estado) fue el principal factor condu-
cente al deterioro de la democracia.  
Palabras clave: Venezuela, deterioro de la democracia, elaboración de 
secuencias, teoría del conflicto de elites, presidencialismo económico 
 
